In this paper, we extend the Disclosure Monitor (DiMon) security mechanism (Brodsky et al. [I]) to prevent illegal inferences via database constraints in dynamic databases. We study updates from two perspectives: 1) updates on tuples that were previously released to a user may cause that tuple to be "outdated", tbus providing greater freedom for releasing new tupies; 2) observation of changes in released tuples may create cardinality based inferences, which are not indicated by database dependencies. We present a mechanism, called Update Consolidator (UpCon) that propagates updates to the user's history file to ensure that no query is rejected based on outdated data. We also propose a Cardinality Inference Detection (CID) module, that generates all data that can be disclosed via cardinality based attacks. We show that UpCon and CID, when integrated into the DiMon architecture, guarantee conjidentiality (completeness property ofthe data-dependent disclosure inference aIgorithm) and maximal availability (soundness property of the data-dependent disclosure inference algorithm) even in the presence of updates.
INTRODUCTION
During the last couple of decades, our society became increasingly dependent on computerized infonnation resources. Electronic databases contain infonnation with sensitivity levels ranging from public (e.g., airIine schedules, phone numbers, and addresses) to highly sensitive (e.g., financial and medical information, military research). The aim of information security policies is to protect the confidentiality (secrecy) and integrity of data, while ensuring data tivailability. Access control mechanisms, such as discretionary and mandatory access control, prevent unauthorized, direct accesses to data. However, they are unable to protect against indirect data accesses, when unauthorized infonnation is obtained via inference channels.
Most of the inference channels in relational databases are created by combining meta-data (e.g., database constraints) with non-sensitive data to obtain sensitive information. Techniques to detect and remove inference channels can be organized into two categories. The first category includes techniques that detect inferencechannelsduringdatabasedesign time [2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20] . Inference channels are removed by modifying the database design andlor by increasing the classification levels of some of the data items. The techniques of the second category seek to eliminate inference channel violations during query processing time [5, 10, 12, 13, 16, 19] . If an inference channel is detected, the query is either refused or modified to avoid security violations. While, in general, database design time approaches are computationally less expensive and may provide hetter onIine perfonnance than query processing time approaches, database design time approaches often result in over-classification of data items, thus reducing data availability. Query processing time approaches allow greater availability by analyzing the data released to the user to detennine whether a security violation is present or not.
Updates in multilevel secure databases have been studied from the perspective of how to perfonn updates safely, creating the problem of polyinstantiation [6, 9] . The main problem is that users with different security levels see different versions of a multilevel secure database. Updates may create inconsistencies among these versions (e.g., inserting a new tuple with an existing but invisible primary key) or create downward signaling channels (e.g., rejection of an update because of the existence of a high security data item).
In this paper we study updates from a different perspective. Instead of addressing the problem of how to ensure secure updates, we focus on how updates can increase data availability due to outdated data. Our work extends the Disclosure Monitor (DiMon) model presented by Brodsky et al. [I] . DiMon detects and eliminates inference channels created by database constraints by using a Disc10sure Inference Engine(DiIE) that generates all infonnation that can be disc10sed based on a user's previous queries (results), the current query (result) and a set of Hom-Clause constraints. The disclosure inference algorithms by the properties of soundness and completeness. Intuitively, soundness means that only existing disclosure inferences are generated by the algorithm (data availability); completeness means that all existing disclosure inferences are generated (secrecy).
However, Brodsky et al. do not consider dynamic databases where updates may lead to cardinality based inferences or may violate the soundness property of the data-dependent disclosure inference algorithm. The following two examples show a proper execution ofDiMon (first example) and an execution that violates the soundness property (second example). Consider the original Employee relation in Table 1 , containing information about the name, rank, salary, and department of employees. The relation satisfies the functional dependency (FD) RANK -+ SALARY. The security requirement is that the employees' salaries should be kept confidential; that is, partial tuples over attributes NAME and SAIARY can only be accessed by authorized users. However, to increase data availability, unauthorized users are allowed to access values for NAME and SAIARY separately.
Suppose an unauthorized user submits the following two queries: Query 1: "List the name and rank of the employees working in the Toy department." (IINAME,RANKuDEPARTMENT=Toy) Query 2: "List the salaries of all clerks." (IISALARyURANK='Clerk) The answers to these queries are: The second relation ofTable 1 shows the updated Employee relation (Query 2).
In this case, DiIE would indicate that subtuple < John, 39, 520 > is disclosed and, since it is confidential, Query 2 should be rejected. However, this subtuple is not contained in the updated relation and has never been present in any of the earlier versions. Therefore, the second query could be safely answered. The reason for this is that the FD was applied on data values that have been modified. We call inferences that were established on outdated (i.e., modified) data values "wrong" inferences. We will pennit queries that generate "wrong" inferences to increase availability. In this paper we propose a conceptual framework, called Dynamic Disclosure Monitor (D 2 Mon), that guarantees data confidentiality and maximal availability even in the presence of inferences and updates. Our work extends the DiMon [1] model by taking into consideration that the data items received by a user may have been updated and are not valid any longer. To the authors' best knowledge, this is the first work that considers updates from the perspective of increased data availability. We propose fonnal characterizations of the effects of updates. We also study the cardinality inference problem that is created by observing changes in query answers over aperiod of time. Our model addresses both inferences via generalized database dependencies (represented as Hom-Clause constraints) and cardinality based (statistical) inferences within the same framework.
We develop a security mechanism, called Update Consolidator (UpCon) that, given a user's history file, updates on the base relation, and the database constraints, generates a new history file that marks outdated data values and indicates only valid inferences. All updates on the base relation are recorded in an update log. The history file of a user contains all data that the user previously received or can be discIosed from the received answers. When a new query is submitted by auser, the his tory file is modified according to the updates that have happened since the history file was last created. Each modified data value in the history file is stamped with the new, modified value. Intuitively, a stamped value means that the value is no langer valid, and the new value, that is unknown to the user, is the stamp. Stamping will prevent the disclosure inference algorithm from indicating a disclosure based on outdated values (soundness) while maintaining maximal equalities among modified data values, thus allowing maximal dependency application (completeness). We show that with the use of UpCon the Data-Dependent Disclosure Inference Algorithm [1] is sound and complete even in the presence of updates.
Moreover, we recommend a Cardinality Inference Detection (CID) mechanism. This module can detect illegal inferences based on small query set size, query overlap, complementary attacks and aggregation based attacks. Since CID may detect a disclosure of a partial secret which, when combined with database dependencies, discloses a secret (DiIE) and vice verse; CID and DiIE work together until no more changes occur. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our Dynamic Disclosure Monitor architecture. Section 3 contains the preliminaries and our notations. In Section 4 we present our Update Consolidator and Cardinality Inference Detection mechanisms. Finally, we conclude our research in Section 5 and recommend future extensions.
2.
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 2.1.
Dynamic Disclosure Monitor
Our model is built upon the Disclosure Monitor (DiMon) security architecture, developed by Brodsky et al. [1] , to protect data confidentiality against illegal inferences in Multilevel Secure (MLS) relational databases. However, DiMon addresses the inference problem in static databases, and thus may overprotect information due to some already modified data values (see the second example in the Introduction). Our extended architecture, called Dynamic Disclosure Monitor (D 2 Mon), incorporates this liberating effect of updates, while still guaranteeing that no unauthorized disclosure is possible via data requests. Note, that we assume that updates are performed in a secure way, Le., we do not consider covert channels created by updates. We propose two extensions to DiMon: 1) an Update Consolidator (UpCon) module that incorporates the effects of the updates on the history files maintained for each user; and 2) a Cardinality Inference Detection (CID) module that detects illegal inferences based on the cardinality of the released answers. The functionality of D 2 Mon is shown in Figure 1 . The shaded modules represent the components of DiMon. The actual algorithm of D 2 Mon is given in Figure 2 . The additional features of D 2 Mon over DiMon are used when Disclosure Inference Engine (DiIE) works in data-dependent mode. Clearly, in data-independent mode when the actual data items received by a user are not known by DiIE, updates made on the base relation will not effect the processing of DiIE. 
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
Before explaining the functionality of the Update Consolidator (UpCon) we need to modify the concept of data-dependent discIosure in dynamic databases and introduce some related concepts. We require that each tuple within the database has a unique tuple identifier I D that is maintained internally and not released to the user. Table 1 shows the original Employee relation with tuple identifiers. When a new record is added to the database, a unique I Dis assigned to it. Modifications to the database are stored in the update log, which we will now define. Given two stamped attributes sa = ai aj and sb = bi bj , we say that sa = sb iff ai = bi and aj = bj. Given a stamped attribute sa = ai aj and a non-stamped attribute b, we say that sa = b iff ai = b and ai = aj.
Next, we need the notion of projection facts and stamped projection facts which are manipulated by the Dirn. where P is a projection fact over Y that satisfies C or P is a stamped projection fact, such that the un-stamped projection fact generated from P satisfies C.
A query-answer pair is either an atomic QA-pair or an expression of the form ('P, IIyuc) , where 'P is a set of (stamped) projection facts {Pb"" 11} such that every Pi, (i = 1, ... ,I) is over Y and satisfies C. 
, where ro is the original relation and ri (i = 1, ... , n), r are the relations generated from TO by the updates in Up, respectively. Dynamic data-dependent disclosure is denoted as
PFU'P,'D[(PF, IIyac), t].
We
denote by [(PF,I1yac),td FU'P [(PF',I1Y'O'C,),t2] the disclosure {[(PF,I1YO'C),tl]} FU'P,'D [(PF',I1Y'O'C/),t2]' where D is empty. In this case, we say that [(PF, I1yO'C) , tl] dominates [(P F', IIy,ac/), t2]'
The above definition requires that all updates are performed according to the database constraints; that is, if a relation r satisfies the set of constraints V before an update, it will also satisfy D after the update. Furthermore, disclosure is established based on updated tuples rather than the originally released tupIes. Intuitively, this may allow auser, who is unaware of the update, to generate a fact that may have never existed in the base relation or is not valid any longer. In either case, we allow such "wrong" inferences, since our goal is to prevent disclosure of valid sensitive data.
By extending the concepts of projection fact and query-answer pairs to incorporate stamped attributes, DiIE can operate on relations containing regular attribute values (constants), stamped attribute values, and null-values. In the following section we develop the Update Consolidator (UpCon) module that creates a new input history file for DiIE by stamping those attribute values that have been modified by an update operation.
UPDATE AND CARDINALITY INFERENCES
In this section we introduce our remaining extensions, the Update Consolidator (UpCon) and the Cardinality Inference Detection (CID) modules.
Update Consolidator
As we illustrated in the Introduction, in dynamic databases it may happen that answers received by a user may not be valid any longer after an update. Clearly, if we refuse a new request of the user based on some outdated data value we unnecessarily limit data access. Update Consolidator (UpCon) propagates updates that happened between the current and the last answered query to the user's history file. For this we require that every tuple of the relation has a unique Toy identifier and all original answers (after the application of selection conditions on the answers) are kept pennanently. Also, we keep track of the database dependencies D that were previously applied on the history-file. Figure 4 shows the algorithm of UpCon. Table 2 shows the stamped history file (tupies 1 and 2) and the incorporated answer of Query 2. Clearly, in this case the FD RANK -t SALARY cannot be applied, since =/:Clerk.
The following problem is decidable: Given a set 'D of database constraints, a set of updates U1', and a set l' of QA-pairs with the time when the QA-pairs have been generated, whether 1'Fu'P,vS for a given set S of atomic QA-pairs.
Theorem 1 will be a corollary to Theorem 2 that states correctness (i.e., soundness and completeness) of DiIE inthe presence of updates. exploited by the inference algorithrn to apply a database dependency remain intact (cornpleteness) and only the valid equalities are present (soundness).
Since starnping an attribute value only reduces possible equalities, and therefore, possible application of the dependencies, the proof of preserving the soundness property is straight forward.
The proof of cornpleteness is constructed as folIows: assume by contradiction that a tuple t is correctly disclosed frorn the originally released tupies, the current query answer, the database dependencies and the updates but t was not generated by DiIE applied on the stamped history file. Since the DataDependent Inference Aigorithrn, used by DiIE is compiete and t is disclosed, DiIE must generate a tuple that dominates t if the originally released tupies, the current query answer and the database dependencies are given as input. 
4.2.
Cardinality Inference Detection (CID)
In this section we present an additional module to detect inferences based on the cardinalities of the query answers. Similar inferences have been considered in statistical databases (see Denning [4] for an overview) and protection techniques have been recommended. CID protects against illegal inferences due to small query set size, query overlap, complementary inferences, and data aggregation. CID and DiIE share their output repeatedly, until all possible inferences are detected. Due to space limitations, CID is not described in details in this paper.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present a Dynamic Disclosure Monitor architecture that guarantees data confidentiality and maximal data availability in the presence of inferences based on database constraint and updates. We propose two extensions of DiMon to incorporate the effects of updates in order to increase data availability and decrease the risk of cardinality inferences: 1) UpCon uses the user's existing history file, updates that occurred, and the database constraints to generate a new history file that does not contain any outdated data values; 2) CID checks for cardinality based inferences, such as small query set size, query overlap, complementary inferences, and data aggregation. CID and DiIE share their output repeatedly, until all possible inferences are detected. We show that using UpCon with DiIE will guarantee data secrecy (completeness property of inference algorithm) and data availability (soundness property of inference algorithm) in the presence of inferences via database constraints.
We conclude with suggestions for further work. Currently we are developing a prototype of DiMon and its extensions to D 2 Mon. We use Java to express the security requirements and implement the disclosure inference algorithms. Completion of the prototype will allow us to provide experimental results in addition to theoretical evaluation of the model. In addition, we recommend the following improvements: Currently the model allows all "wrong" inferences, regardless of whether they reveal data items that had previously existed in the relation or not. However, in certain applications even outdated data might be sensitive, i.e., that John, as a clerk, eamed $38,000. Our update-log based model can be extended to allow distinction of the different kind of inferences.
Also, this paper focuses on multiple attacks of a single user. However in a real-life situation, malicious users can share information, thus obtaining data for which they do not have the proper authorization. Users likely to share infonnation could be grouped together to prevent security violations via collaborating users.
